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MERCURY HERALD COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. MAURICE MOORE, as County Auditor, etc.,
Respondent.
[1] Taxation-Sales-Redemption-Constitutionality of StatuteObligation of Contract.-Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575, providing for the termination, in the manner prescribed, of the
right to redeem property tax-deeded to the state before June 1,
1942, .do not impair the obligation of a contract, because no
contract relationship exists between the taxpayer and the state.
The taxpayer's position is not that of a purchaser who enters
into a contract with the state in purchasing the property, and
his failure to pay the tax leads to the sale of the land as an
exercise of the sovereign power to collect the tax.
I

[2] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Distmctions.-There is a distinction
between the absolute right to redeem within the fixed period
of five years from the date of a sale to the state for unpaid
taxes, and the conditional right to redeem once the property
has been deeded to the state if the state does not sell the property. Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575, affect the second right
only.
[3] Id. - Sales - Redemption-Conditional Right to Redeem.Upon execution of a deed to the state after a failure to redeem
within five years from the date of a tax sale to the state, the
property owner forfeited all rights in the property, except th..,
privilege of redeeming it at any time before the state disposed
of it. Such owner thereafter had at most an offer enabling
him to regain title to the property, which offer could be revoked by the state at any time before acceptance.
[4] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Changes in Method of Redemption.
-While the law in effect at the time of a tax sale to the state
governs the redemption of the property when the Legislature
does not provide otherwise, the Legislature may make retroactive changes in the method of redemption. Such changes, however, cannot be arbitrary or capricious, but must be reasonable when measured in the light of the public interest to be
served and the effect upon rights of the property owner.'·
Those rights are not purely statutory and cannot be destroyed
by the mere repeal of a statute. .

[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 333; 26 R.C.L. 427.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 7, 8 J l'axation, § 329; [6 J Statutes,
§ 33.
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[5] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Rights of Property Owner-Notice
Before Forfeiture.-By proviuing for the redemption of property after sale to the state in the event of a tax delinquency,
the state does not take the property outright from the owner,
but allows him to retain the title and the right to remove the
tax lien and clear his title to the property. l'he mere fact that
the state could provide in the first instance for the complete
taking of property does not mean that the state may with impunity provide retroactively for such a taking without giving
the owner notice or a fair opportunity to prevent forfeiture of
his property.
[6] Statutes-Legislative Power-Limit the Time to Exercise.
Existing Right.-The Legislature may validly limit the time
within which an existing right may be exercised if the period remaining for its assertion is a reasonable one.
[7] Taxation-Sales-Redemption-Validity of Statute Changing
Method of Redemption.-Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 3572-3575,
changing the method of redemption of property tax-deeded to
the state by requiring termination of the right of redemption within one year from the date the legislation became
effective instead of permitting said right to continue until
termination by sale, which might nevel' occur, and giving
the redemptioner four months' notice before termination, do
not arbitrarily deprive him of a property right without due
process of law, but afford him adequate notice and a fair
opportunity to regain the property.
[8] Id.-Sales-Redemption-Method of Disposing of Tax-deeded
Property.-A person having the privilege of redemption has no
right to a particular kind of disposition of tax-deeded property, and may not make an objection that the termination must
be by sale. The state may retain the property and terminate
the right of redemption by giving the former owner as much
notice as he would receive if the state sold the property to
others.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the county auditor
of Santa Clara County to issue a warrant. Writ granted.
Francis A. Zingheim and Che::;ley M. Douglas for Petitioners.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, Assistant Attorney General, Adrian A. Kragen, Deputy Attorney General, J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles),
A. CUl·tis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, Paul A. McCarthy,
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John P. Fitzgerald, District Attorney (Santa Clara), and
Leonard R. Avilla, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
City Attorney (Redwood City), Ernest A. Wilson, City Attorney (San Mateo), and Kirkbride & 'Vilson as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Petitioners.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks by this proceeding in
mandamus to compel the auditor of Santa Clara County to
issue a warrant in payment of a claim for the publication
of a notice to terminate the right of redemption pursuant
to section 3574 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.
The real property described in the published notice was
sold to the state on June 29, 1935, for nonpayment of county
taxes for 1934-35. The law at that time required the tax collector to publish an annual delinquent list of property on
which taxes for the past year wer~ not paid. If the taxes remained unpaid the property was sold to the state. The practical effect of such a sale was to start the running of the
five-year period of redemption. (Orocker v. Scott, 149 Cal.
575 [87 P. 102] ; In re Seick, 46 Cal.App. 363 [189 P. 314].)
If the property was not redeemed within the five years, or
if the taxpayer failed to elect on or before April 20, 1936,
to pay the delinquent taxes in installments (Pol. Code, sec.
3817c(3) ; extended to April 20, 1940, by Pol. Code, sec. 3817e
(7), Stats. 1939, ch. 9) the property was deeded to the state.
(Pol. Code, sec. 3785.) Thereafter, under the law in effect
when the property in question was deeded to the state on
July 1, 1940, the property could be sold by the tax collector
at public auction upon the direction of the board of supervisors of the county and the authorization of the State Controller, if notice of sale was mailed to the last assessee at
least 21 days but not more than 28 days before the proposed
sale, and notice thereof p~blished once a week for three weeks
starting at least 21 days before the sale. (Pol. Code, secs.
3833-3834.25.) If the state did not dispose of the property it
remained subject to redemption. (Pol. Code secs. 3817c (3),,·
3780.)
In 1941 the Legislature provided for the termination of
the right of redemption upon execution of the deed to the
state as to all property not in distressed assessment districts,
deeded to the state on and after June 1, 1942. (Rev. and Tax.

272

MERCURY HERALD CO·, 11. MOORE

[22 C.2d

Code, secs. 3511.3, 3511.5.) If the deed to the state was ex.ecuted before June 1, 1942, as in the present case, notice of
termination must be mailed ~o the last ~sessee within one
year after June 1, 1942, or within six months after default
under a plan of installment payments, whichever of the two
dates is later. (Rev. and Tax Code, sec. 3572.) The tax collector must also publish the notice of termination of right of
redemption once in a newspapcr of general circulation published in the county, or, if none, by posting in three conspicuous places in the county, as to every assessee for whom no
address is known, and for all property assessed to unknown
owners. 'fhe publication must be made within 10 days after
the notice is mailed. (Rev. and Tax. Code, sec. 3574.) If the
property is not redeemed or installment payments commenced
within four months after sending the notice, the right of redemption is terminated. (Rev. and Tax. Code, sec. 3575.)
Since the legislation became effective June 1, 1941, the procedure that it established could not be set in motion for a
year or more.
These provisions are an integral part of a plan to classify
and rehabilitate tax-deeded property. The Legislature also
provided for the appointment of a Land Classification Commission familiar with agricultural economics, real property
taxation, conservation and regional planning, to classify taxdeeded property as desirable for public use, suitable for
private ownership, or wa.~te land, (Chap. 47, Stats, 1st Extra
Session, 1940, Stats. 1941, p. 131.) The statute seeks to expcdite the restoration of real property to the tax rolls. To that
end it provides for the termination of the right of redemption
to facilitate the use or rehabilitation of tax-deeded land while
enabling the state to dispose of it more quickly and at a better
price.
[1] It is contended that the termination of the right of
redemption of the property here in question impairs the
obligation of a contract. There is no contractual relationship,
however, between the taxpayer and the state. (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d
963] ; Perry v. ·Washburn, 20 Cal. 318, 350; Spurrier v. Neumiller, 37 Cal.App. 683 [174 P. 338].) The position of the
taxpayer is not that of a purchaser who enters into a contract with the state in purchasing the property, The taxpayer's own failure to pay the tax leads to the sale of the

)

June 1943]

MERCURY HERALD

Co.

tl. MOORE

273

[22 C.2d 269)

land as an exercise of the sovereign power to collect the tax.
(lVood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61 S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed
1404] ; Yates v. Hawkins, 46 N.M. 249 [126 P.2d 476, 478] :
see Anglo California Nat. Bank v. Leland, 9 Ca1.2d 347 [70
P.2d 937] ; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 380, 386; JI'lli1'head v.
Bands, 111 Mich. 487 [69 N.W. 826, 828].)
[2] It is also contended that the right to redeem after
the property has been deeded to the state but before it has
been sold by the state is a property right, and that the legislation in question deprives the property owner of that right
without due process of law. This contention takes no account
of the distinction between the absolute right to redeem within
the fixed period of five years from the date of sale to the
state, and the conditional right to redeem once the property
has been deeded to the state if the state does not sell the
property. The deed to the state upon the expiration of the
five-year period conveyed absolute' title to the property free
of any incumbrance except liens for certain taxes. (Pol. Code,
sec. 3787; Rev. & Tax. Code, sec. 3520.) [3] Upon execution of
the deed the property owner forfeited all rights in the property except the privilege of redeeming it at any time before
the state disposed of it. (Buck v. Canty, 162 Cal. 226 [121 P.
924] ; Fox v. Wright, 152 Cal. 59 [91 P. 1005] ; Baird v. Monroe, 150 Cal. 560 [89 P. 352] ; Helvey v. Bank of America, 43
Cal.App.2d 532 [111 P.2d 390] ; Curtin v. Kingsb'llry, 31 Cal.
App. 57, 61 [159 P. 830] ; Chapman v. Zobelein, 19 Cal.App.
132 [124 P. 1021], aff'd 237 U.S. 135 [35 8.Ct. 518, 59 L.Ed.,
874] ; Young v. Patterson, 9 Cal.App. 469 [99 P. 552].> The
property owner thereafter had at most an offer enabling him
to regain title to the property, which could be revoked by
the state at any time before acceptance. As the court stated
in Buck v. Oanty, supra, "The Legislature has full control
over the sale of property belonging to the state, which it may
direct sold, and to regulate or change at any time the method
of its disposition." (162 Cal. 226,233.) In Bouth Ban Joaquin
Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2 Ca1.2d 485 [42 P.2d 64L
the court reaffirmed the rule that the taxpayer had no vested
right in the method adopted by the state for the disposition of
its tax-deeded lands. The court declared: "The question is
therefore narrowed -to this: Does the person possessing a right
to redeem also have a vested or such a substantial right in the
method or conditions adopted by the state for the disposition

)
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by it of its tax deeded lands as would deprive the state of the
power to change the method and terms of sale thereof, after
it had received title to the lands T ••• In the absence of eonstitutional limitations, and there is none here, the legislature
is free to dispose of the state's tax deeded lands in any way
deemed by it from time to time to be for the public interest.
. . . It is clear from all the authorities and on reason that
the person having the privilege of redemption has no right
to the disposition by the state of its tax deeded lands in any
particular way when, as here, his right of· redemption is not
adversely affected." (2 Cal.2d 485, 489. See Allen v. Peterson,
38 Wash. 599 [80 P. 849].)
[4] Even if there were no distinction between the right
to redeem before deed to the state and after, a change in the
method of redemption would not necessarily be contrary to
due process of law. While the law in effect at the time of the
sale to the state governs the redemption of the property when
the Legislature does not provide otherwise, it is settled that the
Legislature may make retroactive changes in the method of
redemption. (Buck v. Canty, supra; Fox v. Wright, supra;
Ba·ird v. Monroe, supra,· Wood v. Lovett, supra; League v.
Texas, 184 U.S. 156 [22 S.Ct. 475, 46 L.Ed. 478].) This power
is not unlimited, however. The changes cannot be arbitrary
or capricious but must be reasonable when measured in the
light of the public interest to be served and the effect of the
changes upon the rights of the property owner. Those rights
are not purely statutory and cannot be destroyed by the
mere repeal of a statute. ( ct. Pol. Code, sec. 327; Southern
Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra; Penziner v. West
American Finance Co., 10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ; Krause
v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644 [293 P. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327] ; Berg v.
Traeger, 210 Cal. 323 [292 P. 495] ; Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal.
65 [290 P. 438] ; Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777 [155 P. 90] ;
People v. Bank of San Lu.is Obispo, 159 Cal. 65 [112 P. 866,
Ann.Cas.1912B, 1148, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 934] ; Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315 [66 P. 322].) At the time of
the imposition of the tax the property is in private ownership, and the rights of the owner in that property, not being
derived from statute, cannot be abrogated at wi1l by the
Legislature. When the tax is imposed the state prescribes the
terms of payment and the conditions under which the property
will be taken for nonpayment of the tax. [5] By providing
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for the redemption of the property after sale to the state in
the event of delinquency, the state does not take the property
outright from the owner but allows him not only to retain the
title but the right to remove the tax lien and clear his title
to the property. It does not follow that bceause the state
could provide in the first instance for a complete taking of
the property that it mny with impunity provide retroactively
for such a taking without giving the owner notice or a fair
opportunity to prevent forfeiture of his property. (See Wood
v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61 S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed. 1404].)
[6] It is settled, however, that the Le::ri.,lature may validly
limit the time within which an existing right may be exercised
if the period remaining for its assertion is a reasonable one.
(Alexander, Inc. v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th) 128 F.2d 82;
Allen v. Peterson, supra; Robinson v. Howe, supra; Muirhead
v. Sands, supra.) This rule is akin to the rule that the Legislature may enact a statute of limi~ations applicable to existing causes of action or shorten a former limitation period if
the time allowed to commence the action is reasonable. (Security-First Nat. Bank v. Sartori, 34 Cal.App.2d 408, 414,415
[93 P.2d 863] ; see 16 Cal.Jur. 398; 34 Am.Jur. 44.)
[7] In the present case the redemptioner clearly received
adequate notice and a fair opportunity to regain the property. His position was in fact improved in several respects:
OLD METHOD

NEW METHOD

1. Right of redemption terminated by sale at any
time upon proper notice.

1. One year's delay before
procedure became operative.
2. Four months' notice by
mail before termination;
notice by publication within 10 days after notice
mailed.
3. Right of redemption must
be terminated by June 1,
1943, if property not redeemed or installment payments begun before that
time.

2. Twenty-one days' notice
by mail and by pUblication.
3. Right of redemption continues until terminated by
sale; state not required to

sell

The delay of a year in the new procedure unquestionably
operates to the advantage of the taxpayer. Likewise, a four-

...
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months' notice is more advantageous to him than a twentyone days' notice. As for the third difference, the Legislature
could have provided that all tax-deeded p:coperty be sold by
June 1, 1943, since it is free to determine what property
shall or shall not be sold and when. (Bray v. Jones, 20 Cal.2d
858 [129 P.2d 364] ; South San Joaquin Irrigation District v.
Neumiller, supra; Buck v. Oanty, supra; Merchants' Trust 00.
v. Wright, 161 Cal. 149 [118 P. 517] ; Fox v. Wright, supra.)
From the standpoint of the redemptioner's right there is
little if anything to choose between such a provision and the
one in question. [8] Any objection that the termination must be
by sale is met by the holding in South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, supra, that the person having the
privilege of redemption has no right to a particular kind of
disposition of tax-deeded property. The state would normally
l:icek to sell the property to return it to the tax rolls. While
it may delay in doing so the taxpayer under the old method
could not rely on such delay with any certainty and confidently bide his time to redeem. Any hope he might have had
of redeeming advantageously by waiting rested on mere speculation as to what the state would do. It was not grounded in
any legal right, for the state had the unqualified right to sell
at any time and for any price and thus terminate the right of
redemption. (Buck v. Oanty, supra; Fox v. Wright, supra;
Baird v. Monroe, supra.)
It was held in South San Joaquin Irrigation District v.
Neumiller, supra, that the state can change the method of
disposing of tax-deeded property after receiving the title
thereto, by selling the property to a municipality, irrigation
district, reclamation district, or other public corporation for
such price and upon such terlIlS as may be agreed upon and
thercby terminatc the right of redemption. It can likewise
terminate the right of redamption by selling the property to
a public corporation created to administer tax-deeded property. Just as appropriately the state can retain the property
directly and terminate the right of redemption by giving the
former owner as much notice as he would receive if the state
sold the property to others.
In the cases upon which respondent relies the legislation
in question either substantially impaired the right of redemption without reasonable justification or involved only questions of statutory construction. In Peralta Land & W. 00. v.
Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194], the new
act increased the amount required to redeem. Collier v. Shaf-
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fer, 137 Cal. 319 [70 P. 177], was concerned with the construction of the statute and not with the constitutionality of
any retroactive application thereof. The new law involved in
Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675 [209 P. 892], and Risso v.
Crooks, 217 Cal. 219 [17 P.2d 1001], did not purport to be
retroactive and its constitutionality was therefore not in question. San Diego Oounty v. Ohilds, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 734],
and Oounty of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.2d 192 [44 P.2d
340, 100 A.L.R. 149], concerned acts for refunding certain
obligations of districts organized under the Acquisition and
Improvement Act of 1925. They provided for radical changes
in the right of property owners to redeem lands that had
been sold for delinquent assessments, including reductions in
the redemption period from five years to one year as well as
additions to the amount necessary to redeem. (Of. Oounty of
Los Angeles v. Jones, 6 Cal.2d695 [59 P.2d 489]; Oity of
Dunsmuir v. Porter, 7 Cal.2d 269 [60 P.2d 836] ; Oity of Los
Angeles v. Aldrich, 8 Ca1.2d 541 [-66 P.2d 647] ; Oulver Oity
v. Reese, 11 Cal.2d 441 [80 P.2d 992].)
King v. Samuel, 7 Cal.App. 55 [93 P. 391] ; Wetherbee Y.
Johnston, 10 Cal.App. 264 [101 P. 802], and Main v. Thornton, 20 Cal.App. 194 [128 P. 766], were based upon Johnson
v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [88 P. 903, 119 Am.St.Rep. 181, 10
L.R.A.N.S. 818], upon which the defendant relies particularly. This case involved the validity of a tax deed made in
1899 pursuant to a sale in 1894. Under the law in effect when
the sale was made the purchaser had to serve written notice
upon the owner or occupant thirty days before the right of
redemption expired or thirty days before applying for a deed.
A deed could not be issued to the purchaser without the giving of this notice. The owner retained title until the execution of such dee<l and had at least one year after the sale
and until thirty days after notice in which to redeem. In
1895 the Legislature adopted substantially the present system, providing that property be sold for delinquent taxes to
the state, and if not redeemed within five years be deeded to
the state, and that thereafter redemption might be made
before entry or sale of the property by the state. In referring
to this change the court declared: "To change a right of
redemption which lasts indefinitely until the performance by
a third party of some act which mayor may not be performed, to a riglit limited by the expiration of a definite
period of time is a substantial change in the right." Re-
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spondent relies heavily upon this sentence, inferring a comparison between the right to redeem after deed to the state
until thc state sells, with the right under the old law in the
Johnson case to redeem within thirty days' after the service
of the notice. Actually the court found no basis for such a
comparison, for it clearly regarded the right of redemption
after the close of the five-year period as too insubstantial to
be measured against the previously existing right, and measured instead the five-year period, only to find it also inferior.
It wonld be inconsistent now to give the right formerly regarded as insubstantial the same value as the right formerly
regarded as impaired. Even if the sentence in the Johnson case,
relied upon by respondent, were lifted from the context of the
facts before the court and read literally it would have no bearing upon the present case, where the right of redemption under
the old law was terminated by the act, not of a third person
without title to the property, but of the state itself as holder of
the absolute title. (South San Joaquin Irrigation District v.
Neumiller, supra.) The Johnson case involved the basic right
of a property owner to receive notice of the prospective loss
of title to his property. The notice did not terminate the
right of redemption as sale by the state did, but gave warning
that the right would be terminated if the owner did not redeem. "Under the old law the owner could rest secure until
, he received notice of intention to apply for a deed. He then
had thirty days in which to redeem. Under the new law his
right of redemption could be cut off at any moment after the
expiration of the statutory period, without any personal notification to him . . . That these circumstances worked a
substantial change in the rights which the owner had at the
date of the sale seems clear." The impairment of the right in
the Johnson case is in striking contrast to the absence of any
proof of impairment in the present case.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue.
Gibson, C. J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J. concurring.-I agree that a delinquent taxpayer has no vested right in an existing proceuure for the
collection of taxes. (Wood v. Lo'vett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [61
S.Ct. 938, 85 L.Ed. 1404) j League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158
[22 S.Ct. 475, 46 L.Ed. 478].) There is no contract between
him and the state that the latter will not vary the method of

)
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collection. (lVood v. Lovett, SUp1"a, p. 371; League v. Texas,
su.pra, p. 158.) Nor does a statute changing the procedure
for the collection of unpaid taxes conflict with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution merely because it is retroactive in operation. (League
v. Texas, supra, p. 161; Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371.) ~'or
these reasons the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that a state constitutionally may impose interest upon
delinquent taxes by a law enacted subsequent to the time of
their accrual. (League v. Texas, supra.)
The due process clause does, however, prevent the state
from taking one's liberty or property in an unreasonable and
arbitrary manner. The private ownership of real property
normally does not exist by virtue of a statutory grant, and
the owner is entitled to notice of the fact that his property
will be forfeited if he is delinquent in his obligations to the
state. Prior to the enactment of t1!e 1941 legislation, under
the law governing the collection of taxes, the landowner was
informed that only certain rights in his property immediately
would be taken if he failed to pay the taxes levied upon it
when due; that certain additional rights would be taken upon
a default in payment of his tax obligations during the next
five years, and his title forfeited if he did not pay the accrued amounts before the property was sold for taxes by the
state to another. (Rev. & Tax. Code, pts. 6, 7.) And although
no constitutional limitation requires the state to abide by
these conditions for the collection of the tax, procedural due
process demands that it must, in altering the procedure, give
adequate notice of the change so as to afford the taxpayer
a fair opportunity to prevent forfeiture of his property.
(Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371; League v. Texas, supra, p.
158; and see Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings 00. v. Hill,
281 U.S. 673 [50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed. 1107].)
Sections 3571-78 of the Revenue & Taxation Code are in accord with these principles. They do not arbitrarily deprive
the delinquent taxpayer of his remaining interest in his property but afford him adequate notice that his rights will be
terminated if he does not cure his default within a period
which affords him a fair opportunity to prevent the forfeiture.
The Constitution requires nothing more in this regard.
I am not, however, convinced that the new legislation has
improved the delinquent taxpayer's position or conferred
upon him benefits equally as advantageous as those existing
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uuder the prior procedure. To me, the declaration of Mr.
Justice Traynor to this effect is patently inconsistent with
his statement that the new policy embodies a plan to classify
und rehabilitate tax-deeded property by expediting the restoration of real property to the tax rolls through the termination of the theretofore continuing right of redemption.
Whether a change from a conditional right of redemption
which might continue indefinitely and, in any event, may not
be terminated until after 21 days' notice is less desirable than
an unconditional right to redeem within one year from the
date the 1941 legislation became effective, is a question upon
which reasonable minds may differ. I therefore place my concurrence in the judgment upon the sole ground that the new
procedure is a reasonable regulation of the method for collection of taxes by the state.
CARTER, J., concurring.-The question presented for
"onsideration is whether section 3574 of the Revenue and
rraxation Code, adopted by the Legislature in 1941, imposeR
more onerous conditions upon the right to redeem property
from a delinquent tax sale made prior to the adoption of such
section, and if so, did the Legislature have the power to impose such conditions so as to affect the right of redemption of
property covered by such prior sales 1
In my opinion, said section does impose more onerous conditions on the right of redemption, as it purports to limit the
time within which redemption may be made to a period of
four months after notice instead of permitting the owner
to exercise the right of redemption at any time until the property is sold by the state to a third person. Such being the
case, I shall proceed with the consideration of the question as
to whether or not the Legislature had the power to impose
such conditions so as to affect tax sales made prior to the
adoption of such section.
This court has held in numerous cases, and it appears to
be in agreement with the weight of authority, that the general
relationship of sovereign and taxpayer is not founded on, nor
does it create, any contractual rights; and the obligation of
the citizen to pay taxes is purely of statutory creation, and
taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method
provided by express statute. (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v.
Los Angeles, 15 Ca1.2d 1, 11 [97 P.2d 963] ; Perry v. Wash·
burn, 20 Cal. 318; Spurrier v. Neumiller, 37 Cal.App. 683
[174 P. 338].) It has also been held by this court that the
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power of taxation is not founded upon consent or agreement
but, rather, that tax proceedings are in invitum, and has given
that as its reason why all tax proceedings should be strictly
construed. Judge Cooley in his work on taxation points out
that as between the owner of property and the sovereign
power imposing the tax there is no relationship based upon
contract and that as to the owner, "the remedy by redemption
which the statute gives him, like remedies in general, is subject to legislative discretion." (Cooley on Taxation, vol. 4,
4th ed., sec. 1561, p. 3068.)
Section 327 of the Political Code reads as follows:
"Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when
it is otherwise provided therein. Persons acting under any
statute are deemed to have acted in contemplation of this
power of repeal."
It appears to be well settled in this state that the right of
recovery upon a purely statutory right can be impaired or
abrogated without violation of any right guaranteed by tl,"
state or federal Constitutions. U~outhern Service 00., Ltd. '".
Los Angeles, supra; Penziner v. West American Finance 00 ..
10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ; Krause v. Rm'ity, 210 Cal. 64-1
f293 P. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327]; Berg v. Traeger, 210 Cal. 32:1
[292 P. 495] ; Oallet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290 P. 438] ; Moss
v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777 [155 P. 90]; People v. Bank of San
Luis Obispo, 159 Cal. 65 [112 P. 866, Ann.Cas.1912B 1148,
37 L.R.A.N.S. 934]; Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134
Cal. 315 [66 P. 322].)
The rule estab~shed by these cases is clearly stated by this
court in the case of Krause v. Rarity, supra, at page 652, as
follows:
"The defendant Rarity contends that by reason of th e
enactment of the foregoing statute the cause of action of the
plaintiffs has been wiped out; that section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and section 2096 of the Civil Code have been
repealed in whole or in part by the enactment of section
141% of the California Vehicle Act and that the rule of law
to be applied is laid down in such cases as People v. Bank of
Ban Luis Obispo, 159 Ca1..65 [Ann.Cas.1912B 1148, 37 L.R.A.'
N.S. 934, 112 P. 866]; Wilcox v. Edwards, 162 Cal. 455
[Ann.Cas.1913C 1392, 123 P. 276] ; Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal.
777 [155 P. 90] ; ii'reeman v. Glenn County Tel. 00., 184 Cal.
508 [194 P. 705], and Chenoweth v. Chambers, 33 Cal.App.
104 [164 P. 428]. By those cases the rule obtaining elsewhere
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has become thoroughly established in the law of this state
that when a right of action do~ not exist at common law,
but depends solely upon a statute, the re{>eal of the statute
destroys the right unless the right has been reduced to final
judgment or unless the repealing statute contains a saving
clause protecting the right in a pending litigation. In the case
at bar the cause of action depended solely on the statute.
There is no saving clause and the action is still pending."
In the case of Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, supra, at
page 317, the rule is thus stated:
"It is a rule of almost universal application that, where
a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon
the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not
reduced to possession, or perfected by final judgment, the
repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the appealing
statute contains a saving clause."
It appears to be a rule of universal acceptation that the
clause of the federal Constitution and those of the several
state Constitutions prohibiting the impairment of obligations of contracts runs only to conventional contracts created
by the mutual consent of the parties and not to quasi-contractual obligations imposed by the law and without procuring the consent of the party to be charged. (Lou.isiana v.
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 [3 8.0t. 211, 27 L.Ed.
936] ; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405 [9 S.Ot. 763, 33
JJ.Ed. 193] ; Garris01" v. Oity of New York, 21 Wall. 196, at
203 [22 L.Ed 612] ; Orane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 146 [42
8.0t. 214, 66 L.Ed. 514, 517] ; Read v. Mississippi Oounty, 69
Ark. 365 [63 S.W. 807, 86 Am.St.Rep. 202] (a1f'd. 188 U.S.
739 [23 8.0t. 849, 47 L.Ed. 677]) ; State v. New Orleans, 38
La.Ann. 119 [58 Am.Rep. 168] ; Love v. Cavett, 26 Okla. 179
[109 P. 553] ; Nottage v. O'ity of Portland, 35 Ore. 539 [58 P.
883, 76 Am.St.Rep. 513] ; Anders v. Nicholson, 111 Fla. 849
[150 So. 639] ; State v. Smith, 58 S.D. 22 [234 N.W. 764].)
I am persuaded by the reasoning contained in the foreg'oing authorities that the tax liability of the owner of property is not predicatcd upon contract; that it is wholly of
statutory creation and all rights and privileges granted to the
property owner in connection therewith, including the enforcement of such rights, are founded upon statutory enactment, and such rights may be limited or entirely abrogated
by the IJegislature without violating constitutional provisions
prohibiting the impairment of obligations of contracts.
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Respondent relies most strongly upon the case of Temlta
Land &- Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [48 P. 613, 58
Am.St.Rep. 194], in support of his contention that section
3574 of the Revenue Taxation Act is unconstitutional as being
in violation of the impairment of contracts clauses of the
state and federal Constitutions. While that case contains
language supporting respondent's position, it does not go as
far as is necessary to support the position taken by respondent in this case. The reasoning of the Teralta case was
based upon decisions from other states and opinions of text
writers dealing with the rights of purchasers from the state
of tax-deeded lands. There can be no question but that such
transactions rested upon contract and the rights of the purchasers therein were contractual and vested under ordinary
common-law principles. The rule announced in the Teralta
case is thoroughly sound, but was not applicable to the set
of facts then before the court. The difference between sales
to the state and sales to individuals has been discussed by
this court in the case of Anglo California Nat. Bank v.
Leland, 9 Cal.2d 347 [70 P.2d 937]. But such distinction was
not drawn in the Teralta case. An examination of the authorities relied upon in the Teralta case discloses that they do
not support a rule applicable to the facts of that case. The
decisions from other states are cited without any statement
of facts, and with only one quotation from the cases and,
hence, their inapplicability to the particular facts then before
this court is not apparent until such cases are read and
analyzed. 1'he cases of Merrill v. Dearing, 32 Minn. 479 [21
N.W. 721] ; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 380 (cited in the opinion as 13 Wis. 341), Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82 [87 Am.Dec.
240], and Wolfe v. Henderson, 28 Ark. 304, all involved situations where the property was conveyed by tax deed to an
individual rather than to a state. In addition, the Wisconsin
case involved an extension of time to redeem rather than a
shortening of the period, and the Arkansas case actually
turned upon a question of statutory construction. The other
Minnesota case, Goer:nen v. 8chroeder, B Minn. 344 (cited iIi
the opinion as B Minn. 387), did not involve a tax deed at .
all but involved 8 mortgage. The Iowa case, Negus v. Yancey,
22 Iowa 57, not only fai1s to support the Teralta case but
holds quite to the contrary. True, the last cited case holds
that the law in effect at the time of the sale controls, but
the problem before the court did not involve a change in the
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law after the sale but a change in the law before the sale,
and the question was whether the law at the time taxes
accrue or the law in effect at the time. of the sale should
control. The court held that the redemptioner was bound
by the change in the law, ... the reason given, at page
59 of the opinion, being, "He (the redemptioner) has
no vested rights.or privileges in the terms or provisions of the
law under which he is a defaulter."
The case of Moody v. Hoskins, 64 Miss. 468 [1 So. 622],
involved a situation where the right of redemption was terminated instantly by the repeal of a redemption statute without allowing a reasonable time, or any time, for the taxpayer
to save his property. The court, without any citation of
authority and relying only upon the injustice of such a statute, held it to be invalid. The other Mississippi case, Caruthers
v. McLaran, 56 Miss. 371, involved only a question of statutory
eonstruction.
Thus we find that not one of the cases cited supports the
l!onclusion reached in the 'reralta case, but, to the extent
that they are applicable at all, go no further than to hold
that where a tax sale is made to a private party, contractual
and vested rights arise. And one case, not involving a deed
loan individual, expressly held that the redemptioner was
lJound by the change in the law (Negus v. Yancey, supra.)
It is quite apparent, therefore, that the line of decisions
represented by the Teralta case resulted from a failure to
Ilistinguish between sales to the state and sales to private
parties, and that the distinction noted by this court in the
Anglo California National Bank case requires the overruling
of the Teralta case.
The precise problem involved in this case was recently considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan (Baker v. State
Land Office Board (1940), 294 Mich. 587 [293 N.W. 763]).
In that case the court said at page 767:
"Nor is Act No. 206, Pub. Acts 1893, as amended, unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, impairing the obligation of contract, as claimed by petitioner. Under the express
provisions of the general property tax law of 1893, as amended
by Act No. 325, Pub. Acts 1937, title to all lands within the
borders of the State that had been sold and bid in by the
State became vested in the State upon expiration of the 18month period of redemption. It is ('on tended that prior to the
amending act the periotl of redemption was five years; that
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such an amendment, cutting off title of the owners in a lesser
period of time, cannot apply retrospectively to taxes levied
before the amendment. Counsel apparently refers to 1 Compo
Laws 1929, sec. 3520, as amended by Act No. 250, Pub.
Acts 1933, which requires that lands be delinquent in taxes
for a period of five years before the State can acquire title.
The right of redemption, however, is not a constitutional
right, but exists only as permitted by statute. Keely V. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 25 L.Ed. 327; Durnphey v. Hilton, 121 Mich.
315, 80 N.W. 1. Laws of retroactive character, affecting tax
liens which attached prior to such an enactment, are not unconstitutional. Oity of Detroit v. Safety Investment Oorp.,
288 Mich. 511, 285 N.W. 42; and statutes affecting such liens,
shortening the time previously fixed for sale or redemption,
affect only a remedy for the delinquency of the taxpayer and
do not impair contract obligations or vested rights. See Muil'head v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487, 69 N.W. 826; Board of Supervisors v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72, 100 N.W. 261, Ann.Cas.
792; Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N.W. 849,
90 A.L.R. 853."
In conclusion, and to summarize the views expressed in the
foregoing opinion, the relationship of sovereign and taxpayer
is purely statutory and is not founded on contract, and the
Legislature has the power at its discretion to change the mode
or method of assessing, levying and collecting taxes, including
the termination of the owner's right of redemption from
delinquent tax sales; that section 3574 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code does not constitute a violation of any constitutional provision and is a valid exercise of the legislative
power; that the case of Teralta Land &1 Water 00. v. Shaffer,
116 Cal. 518 [~8 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194], and any other
cases in this state which purport to follow the erroneous
doctrine announced in that case should be overruled, and
that petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandate prayed for
in its petition in this case.
SHENK, J .-1 dissent. In my opinion the legislation under
consideration provides for a shortening of the period of re-demption fixed by the law in force at the time of the sale
for delinquent taxes. The question whether the shortening
of that period is a substantial impairment of the redemptioner's right cannot be answered by the citation of cases whic) I
declare that the Legislature may change the method of re-
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dernption. It is not the method, but the period of redemption
which is involved. Neither may it properly be said that the
right of the redemptioner is amplified l}ecause he is given
more notice when his period of redemption is terminated by
public declaration than when it is terminated by sale to a third
person. Such a pronouncement assumes the point in issue,
namely, that the redemptioner's right may be cut off at an
earlier time than that provided by the law in force at the
time of the sale to the state.
The case of South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2 Ca1.2d 485 [42 P.2d 64], relied on by the majority,
involved only the question whether the state could dispose of
its tax-deeded lands at private sale for cash or on credit. The
decision in that case was that the redemptioner had no right
to the disposition by the state of its tax-deeded lands in any
particular way when his right of redemption was not adversely affected. This court there expressly recognized that
the question of the legislative power to shorten the period of
redemption was not involved.
The rule that the law in force at the time of the sale for
delinquent taxes governs the right of redemption and that
the shortening of the period of redemption is a substantial
impairment of that right has been the law of this state from
an early period. It became and has remained a rule of property. Tax deeds have been voided for failure to comply with
it, and real property titles have been adjusted on the strength
of it. The cases are legion on the subject, a few of which are
the following: Teralta Land ctc. 00. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518
[48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194] ; Oollier v. Shaffer, 137 Cal.
319, 321 [70 P. 177] ; Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [88 P.
903, 119 Am.St.Rep. 181, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 818] ; Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675 [209 P. 892]; Oounty of San Diego v.
Childs, 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 734] ; Risso v. Orooks, 217 Cal.
219 [17 P.2d 1001] ; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal.
2d 192,203-205 [44 P.2d 340, 100 A.L.R. 149] ; King v. Samuel,
7 Cal.App. 55 [93 P. 391] ; Wetherbee v. Johnston, 10 Cal.App.
264 [101 P. 802] ; Main v. Thornton, 20 Cal.App. 194 [128 P.
766].
The peremptory writ should be denied.
Curtis, J'J concurred.
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